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MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILIY: CAN WE EFFECTIVELY COUNTER THE THREAT?
The threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to increase while growing more complex over the next decade.
-Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report
Protection of the homeland is one of the fundamental principles for any modern nation-state. This idea is timeless and dates back to the beginnings of time when man defended his hunting ground so that he could have both sustenance and security. That concept still holds true today, albeit in a much broader context. The United States Constitution explicitly states that one of the roles of its government is to provide for the common defense. To that end, modern defense forces must provide capabilities that cover the land, air, sea, space and cyber domains. Given the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the emerging nuclear capabilities around the globe, it is worthwhile to examine potential delivery systems for those weapons.
The ballistic missile is becoming the weapon of choice to inflict panic and terror, while also serving as a potential delivery means for chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Today, over twenty-five states already possess ballistic missiles, with a number of them developing the capacity for indigenous production and, potentially, for export. Many of these states are continuing to develop these weapon's capacity for increased payload, while also working towards longer range and better accuracy. Some of these same nations are also pursuing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, highlighting the important link between ballistic missiles and WMD programs. 2 The inventory of ballistic missiles around the world has allowed adversaries to be able to extend their reach to well beyond traditional geographic boundaries and in several instances around the globe. The international marketplace in which we now live has also allowed for the transfer and sale of both technology and complete weapons systems to those who are willing to pay for them. The relative small cost of production and procurement of ballistic missiles compared against the investment needed to counter them makes this a weapons system of choice for developing countries. With the volatility of many governments that we have witnessed recently, especially with events such as the Arab Spring, the possibility of weapons falling in to the hands of violent non-rational actors or religious extremist organizations is very real. When we add a nuclear capability to this situation, the consequences become even greater.
President Obama recently stated that "the greatest threat to U.S. and global security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of states." 3 In this paper the author will discuss the missile defense capability of the United States, as well as the capabilities of key allies. More specifically, the author will present a brief background and history of missile defense, as well as detailing modern usage and capabilities. He will then examine the capabilities of current and potential adversaries and make some assessments on the adequacy of our current policies and capabilities. Finally, the author will explore options for a way forward including policy recommendations as well as changes in weapons system approaches to ballistic missile defense.
Background
The United States began its program of missile defense after the Second World
War. This was a direct result of the successful use of V- It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.
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President Obama has not changed the official 1999 published policy, but has outlined a strategy that reflects the need for defense of the homeland, as well as our allies and partners. The current strategy also addresses the need for fiscal responsibility in the area of missile defense and the necessity to assure extensive testing on weapons systems against present and predicted future threat profiles. Finally, the missile defense policy recognizes that cooperation with other world powers, namely Russia and China, should take place. This U.S. policy on missile defense has six components.
First, the United States will continue to defend the homeland from limited ballistic missile attack. Second, the United States will defend U.S. deployed forces from regional missile threats while also protecting our allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves. Third, before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that enables an assessment under realistic operational conditions against threatrepresentative targets to demonstrate that they can reliably and effectively help U.S. forces accomplish their mission. Fourth, the commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term. Fifth, U.S. BMD capabilities must be adaptable to future threats and flexible to adjust as the threats change. Sixth, the United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.
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The United States currently has several weapons systems to counter ballistic missile threats. These systems can be broken down into three different categories. The Aegis weapons system is a complete sensor and interceptor package deployed aboard select U.S. Navy ships. The system is comprised of radar and a missile system capable of acquiring, tracking, and engaging an inbound ballistic missile.
The PATRIOT Missile system continues to be the mainstay of the BMD arsenal for the U.S. Army. It is also a sensor and interceptor package and has been combat proven in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Since its' inception, it has gone through many upgrades, both in terms of hardware and software. One of the pillars of the U.S. missile defense strategy is international partnership. With the larger number of allies in Europe, as well as a previous strategy outlining deployed forces, the Obama Administration has developed a theater-specific strategy for the region. This latest approach to missile defense in Europe is called the missile, we should assume that it will not be long before they acquire the necessary range to reach the continental U.S. In the case of North Korea, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) states "its export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries…illustrate the reach of the North's proliferation activities." 26 North Korean long-range missile inventory includes both SCUD-B and C missiles, as well as the NO-DONG 1 missile. With this arsenal, they can reach up to 1300 kilometers, which includes all of the RoK and most of Japan. North Korea also possesses nuclear weapons, adding concern of a nuclear-capable missile to the current threat. With a recent change in regime in North Korea, the situation remains volatile for the near future.
When we examine the capabilities of China, it is estimated that "by 2015 it will have deployed tens to several tens of missiles with nuclear warheads targeted against the United States, mostly more survivable land-and sea-based mobile missiles. It also will have hundreds of shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles for use in regional conflicts. Some of these shorter-range missiles will have nuclear warheads; most will be armed with conventional warheads." 27 The ability of a non-state actor to enter into the ballistic missile threat category should not be dismissed. As with the German plans during WWII, a ship-mounted launcher with even a short range ballistic missile could pose a threat to the U.S. or its allies. "The ship-based threat includes both ships that enter our ports and vessels near our shores but outside our territorial waters, from where Scud-type missiles with 200-600 kilometer ranges could be launched with devastating effects against our coastal cities." 31 Although this is a low probability event, the consequences of an attack of this type could be devastating, especially if it targeted a nuclear facility or population center.
Gaps between Friendly and Threat Capabilities
The Clearly, we cannot match interceptor inventory with threat ballistic missiles on a one-forone basis, but there is likely some middle ground to lessen the current gap.
The situation becomes much more problematic when we begin to review the threat from regional ballistic missiles. The danger here is both to our allies directly, as well as our deployed U.S. forces and military infrastructure. For our forces deployed in the Pacific, the threat from North Korea and potentially China is real and present.
Current missile defense capabilities include U.S. Patriot batteries deployed in a point defense of U.S. bases. Here again, a well coordinated attack with numerous ballistic missiles could eventually deplete stocks of missiles.
In the Middle East, the situation is potentially much worse. With Iran and Syria having an abundance of short, medium, or intermediate range missiles, attack within the region is a constant possibility. Tensions in the region continue with each new occurrence of a terrorist attack, embassy bombing, or murder of a nuclear scientist.
The Iranian desire to continue their nuclear program also exacerbates an already complicated situation in the region. In recent rhetoric, Iran claims that they will fire 150,000 missiles against Israel if Israel launches an attack against them. 32 The U.S.
has worked closely with Israel to develop and field several ballistic missile defense systems, but here again the inventory of interceptor missiles will be the problem. A salvo of well-coordinated missile launches could easily overwhelm both the personnel and weapons systems involved in engaging the inbound threats. Coupled with terrorist activities or those of Special Forces to damage key missile defense sites, a salvo attack could instill terror in a region within a very short time. One need only examine the impact of 38 SCUD missiles in Israel in 1991on the psyche of the population. "In Tel Aviv, missile attacks had a psychological and political impact far out of proportion to the physical damage they caused." 33 The first missiles that penetrate the BMD architecture will have a dramatic effect on the population and confidence in the defenses will erode.
The gap between regional threat missiles and defensive missile inventories in the Middle East and in the Pacific region highlights the need for continued development and production of theater BMD weapons systems and interceptor missiles. Both the THAAD and PATRIOT missile systems are currently being used in this role, with the fielding of Aegis Ashore scheduled by 2015. The current plan according to the PAA indicates that there will not be full fielding of the architecture until 2020. This indicates that there will be a degraded capability, mostly to deal with ICBM threats, until that time.
Way Forward
As we look ahead to the future, we can certainly see no slowdown of research and development in the area of ballistic missiles. This includes proliferation among current owners, as well as developing countries and possibly non-state actors. The U.S. clearly has policy in place, as well as a plan for the immediate future with the PAA.
In order to effectively counter these current and emerging threats, the United States must look at a proactive combined approach using all elements of National Power.
In the context of diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) efforts, all facets must be used in a complementary manner to deter, dissuade or prevent adversarial use of ballistic missiles. Diplomatic efforts must be used to dissuade adversaries from continuing their development and production or procurement of ballistic missiles. We have several avenues with which to pursue diplomatic means. As a member of the United Nations (UN), we have a strong organization with a membership charter that supports our goals. As one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the U.S. can direct its diplomatic efforts through this forum. Through the Sanctions Committee, the UNSC could impose economic or trade sanctions, as well as diplomatic or financial restrictions. 34 The United States should use its' status on the UNSC to encourage allied participation in measures aimed at countries that continue to manufacture or distribute ballistic missiles.
Another avenue to pursue in the diplomatic realm is the Missile Control Technology Regime (MCTR), an international organization to help with efforts to deter proliferation. The MCTR "is an informal political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. In the military arena, the U.S. should continue its' current missile defense exercises with key partners. These events serve to not only increase partner capacity and cooperation, but to also send a strong signal to adversaries regarding the capabilities of the U.S. and its allies. resource. Currently limited to sensor-only capability, space-based missile defense assets continue to let adversaries know that the U.S. has advanced weapons systems that are highly interoperable; they provide a defense in depth to our homeland and our allies. The overarching military command and control structure provides national leadership and the military with a range of options to respond to ballistic missile threats.
The ability to share launch points and predicted impact points within a global community should go far in deterring an adversary from launching a ballistic missile.
In the economic area of national power, sanctions could be yet another effective means to deter or dissuade the proliferation of ballistic missiles. As previously discussed, the UN is one organization that could be used for sanctions. Additionally, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter clearly allows for members to take direct "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." 39 Continuing efforts with sanctions against offending nations should be used to deter production or sales of ballistic missiles. The U.S. can also work in a bilateral forum with trade partners of offending nations. Incentives to stop trading with an adversary may be an option, or sanctions against the trade partner himself may be in order. Given the prevalent audit trail behind most transactions in our global economy, it
should not take a large forensic effort to identify those who are trading with a suspected offending nation or non-state actor.
Finally, the U.S. should continue funding current missile systems that have been fielded to sustain capabilities that each system provides. This funding should included upgrades to hardware and software, as well as production of missiles and support equipment. Support for both homeland defense systems to counter ICBM threats, as well as stationary and mobile theater BMD assets should be sustained for the foreseeable future. The U.S. should also consider reviving the space-based interceptor capability that was planned under the SDI program in the 1980s. With advances in technology and the space program, it is worthwhile to again put efforts towards research in this area.
Conclusion
With the National Intelligence Estimate painting a grim picture for the future in the area of ballistic missile proliferation, it will be important to confront this problem asymmetrically. The U.S. should continue its' current efforts in ballistic missile defenses, both in research and development, as well as support to currently fielded systems. It should also make use of all elements of national power to deter or dissuade adversaries from reliance on ballistic missiles as a part of their offensive arsenal.
Economic efforts should be targeted to make production of ballistic missiles an unviable option in countries with limited financial means. Finally, the U.S. should leverage its international partners, both from a weapons system architecture perspective, as well as engaging their efforts to help stem proliferation on the global front. Used effectively and in an enduring fashion, economic and diplomatic tools should help the international community to reduce the threat in this area. While no world power can presume to stop the threat of ballistic missile attack, the U.S. and her allies can do much to curb proliferation.
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